What caused the worldwide collapse in output from 1929 to 1933? Why was the recovery from the trough of 1933 so protracted for the U.S.? How costly was the decline in terms of welfare? Was the decline preventable? These are some of the questions that have motivated economists to study the Great Depression.
Cole and Ohanian (1999) document that U.S. per capita GNP fell 38% below its long-run trend path (of 2% per annum growth) from 1929 to 1933. Real per capita nondurables consumption fell nearly 30%, durables consumption fell over 55%, and business investment fell nearly 80%. On the input side, total employment fell 24% and total factor productivity (TFP) fell 14%. On the nominal and financial side, the GNP deflator fell 24%; per capita M1 (currency plus deposits) fell 30%; M1 velocity fell 32%; the per capita monetary base rose 9%; the currency/deposit ratio rose over 160% (Friedman and Schwartz (1963 , Table B3 )); the loan/deposit ratio fell 30% (Bernanke (1983 , Table 1 )); and ex-post real commercial paper rates rose from 6% in 1929 to a peak of 13.8% in 1932.
What caused the Depression? For the U.S., Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 300) argued that it was the decline in the stock of M1 -a consequence of Fed tightening and of a fall in the money multiplier induced by banking panics. According to Eichengreen (1992) , international adherence to the gold standard transmitted the U.S. monetary contraction to other industrialized countries. Specifically, high interest rates and low prices in the U.S. attracted foreign inflows of gold (in 1932 the U.S. and France held over 70% of the world gold reserves), which the Fed largely sterilized (i.e., sold domestic government debt and bought money). The outflow of gold from foreign countries implied that gold-backed money supplies of those countries had to decline in order to meet their cover ratios. Further evidence (see Bernanke and James (1991) , Table 4 ) for the importance of the gold standard in transmitting the contraction comes from the experience of countries like Britain, which suspended the gold standard in 1931 and recovered by 1932; from Spain, which never was on it and had a much less severe contraction than those on the gold standard; and from France, which was one of the last major countries to leave it and still faced declining industrial production past the 1 References
